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For the past eight years Afghanistan has found itself increasingly at a crossroads of intense 
activity in Central Asia. The interests of the region and those of other continents have 
coalesced to form a unique combination of events. The escalating conflict and unresolved 
concerns within, and in relation to, the country have led to renewed international attention and 
focus on Afghanistan and ‘Af-Pak’,2 including increased military and diplomatic activity, 
which is also related to regional challenges and relations. The direct involvement of the 
international community took the shape of a deployment of military forces under UN Security 
Council mandate in 2001 (UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1386) which led to the 
establishment of an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and of a UN Special 
Political Mission in the country. Outside this mandate Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 
was taking place separately and comprised a coalition of forces, with the United States taking 
the lead. Whilst international involvement has intensified in Afghanistan, finding a resolution 
to the ongoing conflict has so far defied diplomatic and military efforts.  
 
A feature of the conflict in Afghanistan, during approximately the last 150 years,3 has been 
the involvement of external forces and organisations and this has been a growing trend in 
recent decades. However, during that period Afghanistan was also at peace for long periods. 
There is no reason why long-lasting peace cannot be re-established. Afghanistan, its 
neighbours, the region and the international community together, all possess a vested interest 
in making a sustained peace in Afghanistan, despite the existing challenges. In spite of the 
difficult circumstances within Afghanistan and those that have been imposed upon the 
country and its people, the role of reconciliation has always provided a successful means − 
and an accepted method − for the settling of conflict. Indeed reconciliation has been a central 
feature of both social practices and social norms of the peoples of Afghanistan, often 
replacing the use of force. This has been the case locally, regionally and internationally. The 
Pashtun tribes along the border have a long history of well-developed religious, social and 
tribal structures, including their own governance and methods of resolving disputes. The 
                                                 
1 Since 2002, the principal author of this paper, Talatbek Masadykov, has worked in Afghanistan as a Political 
Affairs Officer, Head of UNAMA Field Office and latterly as Chief of the Political Affairs Division, UNAMA. 
He has had contact with a wide range of sources, including Afghan government officials, the international 
community, military forces, tribal and religious leaders, civil society and anti-government elements, as well as 
their representatives, in various countries. He and the co-authors wish to express their thanks to all those whose 
views helped inform this paper and the production of it. This includes UNAMA reports, internal documents, 
statistics and discussions. In order to prepare this paper he took  four months research leave in 2008, which he 
spent as a Visiting Fellow at the Crisis States Research Centre and travelling around the region. 
2 Af-Pak refers to the area including Afghanistan and Pakistan and the combined political entity that is 
constituted by the close relationship between the actions, past and present, of actors in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
3 Afghan wars: the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839-1842), Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-1881), Third 
Anglo-Afghan War (1919), Soviet war in Afghanistan (1979-1989), Soviet involvement, Afghan Civil War 
(1989-1992), Najibullah’s Regime collapse, Afghan Civil War between Mujahadeen (1992-1996), anarchy, 
Afghan Conflict (1996-2001), Taliban regime. 
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current instability, rather than being due to local traditions, is more the result of decades of 
conflict and the intentional dismantling of traditional structures in conflict, thereby leaving 
extremist groups to fill the social, political and security vacuum. It is a universal condition 
that societies develop their own social norms and methods to resolve and settle conflict, since 
communities cannot exist without the effective resolution of conflict. 
 
This paper discusses the debate on reconciliation and negotiations with the Taliban, its future 
prospects and the role of the United Nations within it. It provides an outline of the current 
conflict as well as a discussion of the role of the UN and ISAF within it, from both a political 
and a legal perspective. We argue that the very fact the conflict in its various phases has been 
going on for so long offers opportunities for reconciliation. The bulk of the paper is inevitably 
dedicated to analysing the position of the different actors vis-à-vis negotiations. We deal with 
both pro-Afghan government and anti-government players, as well as with international 
actors. We review in detail past initiatives aimed towards reconciliation and explain why they 
did not succeed. In our conclusion we highlight some possible future steps to be taken. 
 
 
The Current Conflict in Afghanistan 
The current conflict in Afghanistan began on October 7, 2001 with a US military operation 
(OEF). This was launched in response to the September 11 attacks in New York. Two 
military operations are currently active in Afghanistan involving international forces. OEF is 
currently operating primarily in the eastern and southern parts of Afghanistan along the 
Pakistan border, and as of June 2009 approximately 28,300 US troops have been involved.  
The second international operation is the ISAF, which was established by the UNSC on 
December 20, 2001, under Resolution 1386. This same resolution created the UN Special 
Political Mission for Afghanistan.4 
 
It was agreed that under the Bonn Agreement, no armed groups would be present in Kabul. 
However this was not achieved due to the conditions at the time. At the end of 2003 it was 
argued by the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), Lakhdar Brahimi, 
that ISAF should move out to areas both surrounding Kabul and throughout the country. On 
August 11, 2003, NATO took over the command and coordination of ISAF. On October 13, 
2003, the UNSC authorised the expansion of ISAF's operations to include operations 
throughout Afghanistan under Resolution 1510 (UNSC 2003).5 
 
The first obvious sign of a deterioration in security took place in March 2003 in Kandahar 
province, when an ICRC International staff-member was killed by a Taliban group led by 
Mullah Dadullah. This was a profound shock for the international aid community. In 2004, 
security incidents became more frequent in Kandahar, Uruzgan and Zabul provinces. In the 
autumn of 2004, presidential elections took place countrywide and on election day not a 
single security incident occurred in the whole country. As a result, rumours − especially 
persistent in the southern region − circulated that the US had pressured the Pakistani 
government for attacks to cease so that elections could take place. However, security 
continued to deteriorate after the elections − during 2004 the UN stopped travelling by road 
between Kandahar and Uruzgan − and this continued during 2005. 
                                                 
4 This was initially called United Nations Special Mission Afghanistan (UNSMA), and later referred to as United 
Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan (UNAMA). 
5 http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/mandate/unscr/resolution_1510.pdf 
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During the autumn of 2005, parliamentary elections were held and several security incidents 
took place. During the summer of 2006, there was a major escalation of the insurgency. The 
south was no longer readily accessible and there were security incidents in the south-east of 
the country and in the west. The UN restricted movement for its staff in unstable areas as a 
result. In 2007, the security situation further deteriorated in the south, south-east, west and 
east, and there was also violence in other areas. In 2008, almost 50 percent of Afghanistan 
was effectively a ‘no-go area’ for the international aid community and the UN. In the early 
part of 2009, various reports indicated that over 60 percent of the country was no longer 
safely accessible. However, since ISAF and the coalition forces regard the presence of a base 
in a region and the ability to travel in armed convoy as it being under control, even though 
attacks can take place and international aid organisations are unable to travel due to the 
security situation, this probably underestimates the true figure.  
 
Successive UN resolutions have given a mandate for both a UN Assistance Mission, as a 
Special Political Mission, and for the presence and operations of ISAF. The latest resolution 
is UNSC Resolution 1868, of March 23, 2009, which states: 
‘Unanimously adopting resolution 1868 (2009), the Council instructed the United 
Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) to lead international 
civilian efforts to, among other tasks, promote coherent international support to 
the Afghan Government and adherence to the principles of the Afghanistan 
Compact; strengthen cooperation with the International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF); and, through an expanded presence countrywide, provide political 
outreach.’ 
The latter part, ‘to provide political outreach’, was first part of the UN mandate for 
Afghanistan in March 2007. The mandate of 2008 shaped further the political aspect to the 
UN’s role and refers to good offices – including assistance with reconciliation − if requested 
by the Afghan government (UNSC 2007, 2008, 2009). This was further developed in 
Resolution 1868 (UNSC 2009), which reads: 
‘Provide political outreach through a strengthened and expanded presence 
throughout the country, provide good offices in support of Afghan-led 
reconciliation programs.’ 
As can be seen from events thus far, though ISAF and coalition forces have had conventional 
military superiority over anti-government elements, their actions since 2001 have pushed 
these towards active insurgency.6 The Taliban, with the assistance of certain elements within 
military structures, radical foundations and Islamic political parties from other countries in the 
region has re-trained, re-equipped and pushed back significant gains by coalition forces. 
 
By January 12, 2009, ISAF had approximately 55,100 troops from 41 countries, with NATO 
members providing the core of the force, of which approximately 23,300 troops came from 
the US.7 Under the new US administration and its plans, a ‘surge’ in troop numbers is 
                                                 
6 The use of the term ‘insurgency’ for the state of conflict in Afghanistan has in the past been regarded by some 
in the Afghan government as problematic − presumably as this has, and had, negative connotations for their 
governance, since public support for the government is called into question, and also for the Afghan population, 
which must necessarily be at the centre of any settlement of the conflict. Nevertheless, it is generally accepted 
that an insurgency (defined as an organised movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government 
through use of subversion and armed conflict, by means of a protracted politico-military struggle designed to 
weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control) is present in Afghanistan, and 
this has been openly discussed by military figures, such as General Petraeus, as well as by political figures.  
7  http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat_archive/isaf_placemat_090112.pdf 
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expected in the range of 17,000 to 20,000 troops. Although this can be seen as a positive 
statement of commitment by those forces and their governments, opinion remains divided 
regarding the longer-term utility of this to the overall process of improving security in 
Afghanistan and therefore its efficacy, without other factors being addressed. Whilst an 
increase in troops may be helpful for stabilising the security situation in some areas, and to 
some extent for combating insurgents amongst the people in a military capacity, it is generally 
accepted that this cannot in and of itself bring security and peace. For example, during the 
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, between 80,000 to 116,000 troops (depending on the 
period) were stationed and operated in the country. Despite their presence, the conflict was 
not resolved as the majority of the population did not support the Soviet-supported Afghan 
government of the time. Though more modern weapons are available today to ISAF and OEF, 
it is still unlikely that a military approach will ultimately settle the conflict. A substantial 
increase in the number of international forces (from some 30,000 in early 2006 to 64,000 in 
January 2009) has taken place, and during the same period there has been a significant and 
steady deterioration of security conditions, with a resurgence of anti-government elements. 
Indeed, according to UNDSS and other data viewed by the authors, attacks by insurgents in 
2008 were 50 percent higher than in 2007, averaging 460 security incidents per month 
(Afghan NGO Safety Office 2009; Iraq Coalition Casualty Count 2009). In an insurgency 
where ‘the enemy is deliberately choosing to keep the level and nature of the conflict where 
advantages of numbers and equipment are neutralized’ (Smith 2006: 276), it is therefore the 
case that a surge using military means will not lead to a large reduction in security incidents. 
Under the current conditions of an insurgency in Afghanistan, as with other insurgencies, 
insurgents have been developing operations by creating disorder, using propaganda, 
improvised explosive devices, executions and assassinations. For example, during 2006-7 the 
Taliban, in districts of the southern provinces, executed those suspected of informing or of 
passing any information to international military forces. One such case was the execution of a 
14 or16 year old youth along with an elderly lady in Helmand province. Their execution had a 
profound effect on the population. In different parts of unstable areas, the Taliban also 
assassinated other persons suspected of spying for international security forces and for 
working for governmental organisations. In 2007-8 the Taliban were able to easily assassinate 
government officials in Kandahar city.8  
 
For the period from 2001 to 2005, the population was largely supportive of the government. 
In 2006-7, public opinion began to shift in favour of anti-government elements in unstable 
areas. For the period late 2008-9, the population in unstable areas is voluntarily providing 
support to insurgents, and the population in stable areas is distancing itself from the Afghan 
government. Beginning in the spring of 2008, the Taliban altered their strategy, moving from 
intimidation of the people, toward attempting to win their hearts and minds. Taliban sources 
confirmed that a decision to change tactics had been taken, so that the Taliban would stop 
killing Afghan civilians and target only those affiliated with the government, international 
military forces and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).9 Intimidation nonetheless 
continued: in 2009, the population was told not to take part in the presidential elections or to 
face punishment. Girls were intimidated to stay away from school in some areas, as were 
male students and teachers in other areas. The spread of Taliban activities and other 
outrageous acts can be regarded as an attempt by the Taliban and anti-government elements to 
provoke a reaction, which can be an over-reaction as far as the civilian population is 
concerned. An example of this is the use of military force that creates collateral damage, 
                                                 
8 Author’s personal conversation with Elders from Helmand and Kandahar provinces. 
9 Based on the reports received from Afghan National Security Forces and local interlocutors. 
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injuring or killing bystanders (Smith 2006: 276). However, the conflict has had negative 
effects for all parties, making the aim to reduce violence potentially more attractive.  
 
UN, ISAF: Under the Same Mandate 
UNAMA is a special political mission in support of the mandate under UNSC Resolution 
1868 (2009), rather than a peacekeeping mission. The fact that ISAF and UNAMA are under 
the same mandate has been a considerable source of concern in recent times, not only for 
those operating within these institutions, but also for anti-government elements and the 
public. Whilst ISAF was not conducting military operations, it was acceptable to be under a 
UN mandate. When ISAF commenced combat operations, however, the political implications 
altered substantially, as a gap opened between the actions and activities of ISAF and the aims 
of UNAMA. The view of the Taliban is that the UN is tasked with bringing peace; yet it 
operates under the same mandate as ISAF, which has been conducting combat operations 
since 2003. This contradiction is visible to the population of Afghanistan as well.  
 
Moreover, ISAF has struggled to adopt tactics better suited to counter-insurgency and its use 
of firepower has not always been sufficiently selective; at the same time it has struggled to 
cope with the political dimensions of counter-insurgency. The Taliban also cause collateral 
damage within the civil population, not least by using civilians as human shields, but they 
have used civilian losses for their own propaganda as well. In rural areas, the population is 
largely illiterate, uneducated and without access to a variety of news sources. In the eyes of 
civilians, the international military forces are often wrong on both counts, even if the 
difficulty in targeting Taliban amid the general population is well understood to 
knowledgeable observers. In view of plans for a military ‘surge’ it is important to guard 
against overreaction, as this would only help to drive the insurgency further and with 
increasing momentum. These rather inevitable consequences of military action strengthen the 
need for a resolution to the conflict.  
 
As the largest contributor to ISAF and the proponent of OEF, the United States is also the 
only country present and the only international military force with a developed strategy 
towards insurgency in Afghanistan. Their counter-insurgency strategy can be typified in a 
critically acclaimed, well received and respected interim field manual (Department of the 
Army 2004). This strategy includes maintaining close coordination with the host nation’s 
internal defence and development organisations.  
‘Combat operations are developed to neutralize the insurgent and, together with 
population and resources control measures, establish an environment within 
which political, social and economic progress is possible. IO [Information 
Operations] integrate all aspects of information to support and enhance the 
elements of combat power, with the goal of dominating the battle-space at the 
right time, at the right place, and with the right weapons or resources.’ 
 
The manual advocates a bottom-up approach rather than the imposition of force alone, and in 
closing with the enemy, as the enemy is intertwined with the civil population, indeed, the 
latest version of the manual (Department of the Army 2009) states: 
‘The end state of counterinsurgency operations is a legitimate Host Nation 
government that can provide effective governance.  This includes providing for 
their populace, eliminating the root causes of the insurgency and preventing those 
root causes from returning.’   
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In terms of effective action: 
‘Commanders at all levels should select the LOE’s (lines of effort) that relate best 
to achieving the desired end state.  The following list of possible LOEs is not all-
inclusive, However, it gives commanders a place to start: 
• Establish civil security. 
• Establish civil control. 
• Support HN [host nation] security forces. 
• Support to governance. 
• Restore essential services.10 
 
However, it has been repeatedly seen that there are very great problems for the overall 
strategy and for its successful, as well as consistent and coherent, application. The reality in 
the past has been that these operations have caused considerable collateral damage in an 
environment of suspicion regarding the motives and intent, if not the methods, of international 
forces. Protecting the population has both hard and soft elements and each has its challenges. 
Moreover collateral damage hurts international forces most, due to historically rooted 
suspicions. There is little prospect of several of these circumstances significantly being 
altered, a fact that strengthens the importance of approaching the conflict from a new 
perspective. 
 
Another argument in favour of an effort towards reconciliation are the presidential elections 
scheduled for August 20, 2009. Without adequate security and with a loss of confidence in the 
electoral process, there is the very real possibility that: 
‘The consequent sense of frustration or futility or fear of reprisals among sections 
of the population may lead them to embrace the assumption or conviction that 
violence is necessary, in which case there follows a carefully planned and 
executed struggle to seize the means of state power by using rational-calculating 
methods.’ (Keene 1996: 134) 
 
Unfortunately, there exists the very real danger that if the current path and approach is 
continued without appropriate alteration, the political, economic, social and security 
conditions will move from a situation of insurgency into one of civil war. This would have 
grave implications for all parties involved, including the international community. 
 
A New State? 
John Keene (1996: 134) remarks that ‘[c]ivil war is triggered by the absence of effective 
formal and informal channels for resolving certain social and political grievances’. Currently 
the most vulnerable area in Afghanistan is the south. In this region of the country a large 
proportion of the population is Pashtun. Pashtuns throughout the area feel that the 
international community mainly supports the non-Pashtun ethnic groups, who together blame 
them for constituting the core of the insurgency, or at least accuse them of being pro-
insurgency. The danger of this is that Pashtun nationalists of all kinds could be drawn into the 
                                                 
10 In earlier versions of the manual on counterinsurgency (Department of the Army 2004) it is stated that: ‘US 
forces can assist countries that are confronted by an insurgency by providing a safe and secure environment at 
the local level and continuously building on incremental successes.…End state and criteria of success: Protect 
the population; Establish local political institutions; Reinforce local governments; Eliminate insurgent 
capabilities; Exploit information from local sources.’   
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insurgency. This could eventually compromise the achievements of the past eight years, made 
by both the present government and the international community.  
 
Sun Tzu (2008) states that ‘[w]hat is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s 
strategy; next best is to disrupt his alliances; next best is to attack his army.’ Smith (2006: 13) 
states, however, that one strategy rarely manages to be so successful over the other. It is also 
instructive to relate the strategic and tactical dynamic to the conflict. As Paddy Ashdown 
(Financial Times, February 12, 2008) has stated in relation to Afghanistan, selectively quoting 
Sun Tzu: ‘Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy is 
the noise before defeat.’ An integrated approach is, in an insurgency, the only means to win 
the hearts and minds of the population, whilst strengthening the government institutions. 
These institutions draw off major sources of discontent in the civil population, amongst whom 
it is so important to gain support rather than driving them towards the insurgency through 
incremental alienation; and for this military means alone cannot suffice. As Rubin and Rashid 
(2008: 44) have written: 
‘Lowering the level of violence in the region and moving the global community 
toward genuine agreement on the long-term goals there would provide the space 
for Afghan leaders to create jobs and markets, provide better governance, do more 
to curb corruption and drug trafficking and overcome their countries’ widening 
ethnic divisions. Lowering regional tensions would allow the Afghan government 
to have a more meaningful dialogue with those insurgents who are willing to 
disavow al Qaeda and take part in the political process.’ 
 
Violence induces radicalisation, but this can be only a temporary effect and one which can 
also be lessened and its effects reduced in a number of ways (Keane 1996). In today’s 
Afghanistan, therefore, the scope for communication might be much wider and more central 
than some dogmatic or ‘principled positions’ that some may advocate. A process of 
reconciliation can lead to engagement in a way that is in keeping with the objective of both 
sides, which is that of necessary settlement and peace. This is an objective that requires 
incremental work. Indeed, communication is the most important element in settling matters: 
‘Without a process of reconciliation, conflicts considered to have been resolved can reappear 
and jolt the social climate in the national and international arena’ (Nets-Zehngut 2007). 
 
Reconciliation11 can take place whilst violent conditions and violence still exist and can help 
generate a resolution to such conflict. Both violence and contact are riddled with ambiguities, 
yet contact can be a positive activity even if it does not bring about the desired result. 
Violence, even when justified by an extremist rhetoric, can serve the purpose of a trial of 
arms through which opposite parties test their respective strength. In the context of 
Afghanistan, with the great costs of the conflict so far endured and with the security situation 
worsening, the cost of communication between groups is relatively low.  
                                                 
11 Bloomfield et al. (2003) define reconciliation as: ‘A broad and long-term process through which a society 
moves from a divided past to a shared future. The process of reconciliation is finding a way to live that permits a 
vision of the future; the (re)building of relationships; coming to terms with past acts and enemies; a society-
wide, long-term process of deep change; a process of acknowledging, remembering, and learning from the past.’ 
Reconciliation is dependent upon contact and communication. History demonstrates that the ability for humans 
to be reconciled is as marked as our capacities for extreme behaviour. It is also not unusual for discussions to be 
started before the cessation of hostilities. 
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The existing situation in Afghanistan 
As has been observed, the security situation in Afghanistan is deteriorating, at a rate that is a 
cause for alarm. At the time of writing, there is still a very weak and corrupt government in 
Afghanistan, which is not supported to any great extent by the majority of the population. It is 
well known among the civilian population that the government, as well as the Afghan security 
forces, includes infamous warlords and these are supposed to form the nucleus of state-
building institutions. They are regarded by many Afghans as no better than those leaders of 
the Taliban and Hezb-e-Islami who form the main opposition groups; this is especially so in 
the eyes of significant numbers of Pashtuns. A weak government, combined with civilian 
casualties from combat operations, is the main factor allowing the Taliban and Hezb-e-Islami 
to increase their reservoir of support and numbers. According to American military figures, 
civilian deaths in air strikes grew from 116 in 2006 to 321 in 2007, as the insurgency 
increased. Over the same period, the number of American air raids in Afghanistan increased 
by a third, and the number of bombs dropped doubled (The Economist, August 28, 2008).  
Since 2007, civilian deaths from air strikes, according to UN figures, were approximately 
530, an increase from 2007 of just over 65 percent (UNAMA 2009).  Between 2007 and 
2008, the number of close air-support sorties, according to US Air Force figures, increased by 
approximately 46 percent.  Air strikes − termed ‘kinetic strikes’ by US forces in OEF − 
increased by just over 7 percent between 2007 and 2008 (figures from US Central Command). 
As combat operations have increased, so have the number of air strikes, with consequent 
civilian casualties. The effect of this increase in the use of military force may be seen in the 
fact that two to three years ago, local communities in rural areas of the unstable provinces 
were not willing to support anti-government elements. In stark contrast, people in villages 
now provide shelter and food for anti-government elements voluntarily, and in cases where 
these are being pursued or chased by IMF/ANSF they hide them in their compounds 
(Interviews, local villagers).  
 
The combined effects of this change, along with its effect on government institutions, has led 
to President Karzai’s speeches on TV and Radio that he is a ‘guest in his country’, and that he 
has ‘no power’, that international military forces do not listen to him, and that they continue 
to use air strikes, which have become a deeply contentious matter. This increases the 
perception and belief amongst the population that the government is weak. It has also given 
the impression that the Afghan government is going to collapse, as well as the view that 
international military forces are present in Afghanistan to create difficulties, rather than to 
resolve them. This situation has been further exacerbated by President Karzai’s emotional 
message to Mullah Omar in late 2008, which was rejected by Mullah Baradar, a close 
associate of Mullah Omar and fellow member of the Taliban Supreme Council. The 
consequent impression has given confidence to anti-government elements, and has led to the 
belief that they are getting stronger and that the government as well as international military 
forces are becoming weaker. 
 
Developments in neighbouring Pakistan and Iran have also had an impact on anti-government 
elements. Pakistan is experiencing heavy fighting in several cities and districts between these 
and governmental forces; and the Afghan Taliban are both present and operational. Iran has 
taken the view that despite Sunni/Shia disagreements with the Taliban over ideology and 
religious matters, in the present circumstances ‘the enemy of my enemy is a friend’ and 
certain Iranian border-based groups have had contacts with the Taliban. Hezb-e-Islami 
(Hekmatyar) was more or less equally supported by Iran and Pakistan. Certain fundamentalist 
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political groups in Iran and Pakistan are thought to be supporting some anti-government 
elements in Afghanistan (Interviews, border officials). 
 
The international community insisted on the presidential elections in 2009, allowing them to 
take place. However, their free and fair character was highly dubious in the view of many 
Afghans and the international community and the UN ended up being blamed for their flaws. 
The effect of these elections may well be that the country is going to be more than ever 
politically divided into two parts: Pashtun and non-Pashtun. Furthermore this could very 
possibly unite all groups of Pashtuns behind stronger elements, such as the Taliban, Hezb-e-
Islami and jihadi groups − even those who are secular nationalist and progressive democrats.  
 
Obama’s administration has a new policy towards Afghanistan: to ‘defeat the hardcore 
Taliban militarily and engage with the moderate elements’. It was perhaps not constructive to 
state this openly and to differentiate between these ‘factions’.12 Prior to this statement, some 
Taliban of a more moderate persuasion were willing to enter into discussions regarding 
reconciliation so to commence a peace process. Unfortunately, the statement by the Obama 
administration was interpreted as a signal of a lack of true willingness to engage in talks. As a 
result, far fewer Taliban are inclined to come forward or to discuss coming on-side. 
 
UNAMA’s Mandate and Further Actions and Activities 
In UNAMA’s March 2007 mandate renewal, the mission was directed ‘to extend its good 
offices through outreach in Afghanistan.’ It was understood that UNAMA would expand its 
dialogue and political outreach in support of the ongoing reconciliation programme, Program 
Tahkim-e-Solh (PTS), and would plan to support any future reconciliation programmes led by 
the Afghan government. The areas of political outreach and reconciliation in Afghanistan are 
not very different in practice. Both are supposed to reconcile anti-government elements who 
would support the Afghan constitution, cease violence and fighting, and commence a peaceful 
form of existence. During the Bonn Process in 2001, reconciliation received little or no 
support from the Afghan leaders recognised by the international community, or from the 
United States. Now, after several years of steadily increasing and intensifying insurgent 
activity in the south, south-east and south-west – now spreading northward – any serious 
effort to facilitate a reconciliation process will be considerably more difficult than half a 
decade ago. Nevertheless, it is apparent that further delaying a serious approach to negotiation 
would only lead to an even greater cost to eventual negotiations.  
 
President Karzai has announced several times that the Afghan government is ready to talk to 
all groups that comprise anti-government elements, including their leaders. The leaders of 
hardcore Taliban and Hezb-e-Islami have responded that the negotiations are possible only if 
the international military forces leave Afghanistan. This position seems to be flexile to some 
degree, judging from different statements, and a withdrawal timetable might suffice to enable 
negotiations to be started. There is a growing consensus within the Afghan government, the 
international community and a significant proportion of individuals currently considered anti-
government elements, over the need to promote reconciliation. In fact, the extremely sensitive 
nature of discussions, political outreach and reconciliation remain at the forefront of both the 
government and the international community’s agenda.  
                                                 
12 As Kilcullen (2004) has put it: ‘We must distinguish Al Qa’eda and the broader militant movements it 
symbolises – entities that use terrorism – from the tactic of terrorism itself.’ This does not mean that this has to 
be done openly. Rather, approaches such as reconciliation that can gain traction in a wider and more integrated 
strategy, can be effected without such public pronouncements and in order to build confidence, as well as taking 
the higher moral ground. 
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This is in part due to the impetus given by the successful Afghan-Pakistan peace jirga in 
August 2007, which has been followed up. Discussions in 2007 have taken place largely 
within the context of the Policy Action Group (PAG), which is trying to mobilise the relevant 
parties. UNAMA and US and UK governmental representatives worked jointly under the 
framework of the PAG on the fundamental principles to underpin a reconciliation process in 
2007. The National Security Council welcomed this effort and stated that it would prepare the 
Afghan government version of the key principles. Since then, there has been no movement on 
this particular matter.  
 
The Positions of pro-Government and anti-Government Groups toward Reconciliation. 
With regard to the PTS, President Karzai is cognisant that the programme has had limited 
results. The PTS was designed to win over former insurgents through the process of 
contacting and subsequently checking on their past activities and links. Certificates were 
issued once individual cases were processed. Those who went through the programme 
successfully were then supported to settle and to live a peaceful existence. In some areas, 
former Taliban were given land, such as in Khost province. Unfortunately, this programme 
enjoyed relative success only in the beginning and it subsequently suffered significant blows. 
Indeed, some of those participants who went through the programme found out that they were 
not necessarily safe, and in a significant number of cases participants were not treated by 
international military forces in keeping with the PTS agreement. As a result, trust was lost 
amongst those anti-government elements who were willing to be reconciled. By 2007, the 
programme was consequently on the wane. Later, it was stated that by 2008 some 5,000 
former insurgents had been reconciled. However, the actual figure is more likely to be half 
this. Moreover, in many cases even the internally displaced persons brought in were not 
receiving the full amount they were supposed to receive, creating problems with the 
credibility of the whole process.  While the president personally believes in the value of 
reconciliation, he is under pressure from northern Jihadi leaders and possibly from the US to 
keep, at this time, to rhetoric rather than action. Despite these shortcomings and pressures, 
Karzai is keen to strengthen the PTS and would like the person in charge, Sigbhatullah 
Mojadeddi, to retain an honourable role. Professor Mojadeddi, the head of the PTS 
commission and spokesman of the Upper House, is respected among key Jihadi groups, but 
has little influence beyond his own party members. His background prevents him from being 
seen as a trustworthy interlocutor by most anti-government elements. It is noteworthy that 
despite his position as head of the PTS, he was not selected to be part of the 
Afghanistan/Pakistan Peace Jirga commission, suggesting that the government is aware of his 
limited reach (Interviews, Afghan governmental officials).  
 
Some ministers enjoy strong links to the Taliban, including several Mahaz commanders. 
While some ministers are given considerable credibility in Pakistan, others are not. It can be 
seen that there is therefore little unity in the government on reconciliation matters. A number 
of ministers, meanwhile, spend considerable time gathering information regarding anti-
government elements, such as those who belong to non-Pashtun groups or to the Northern 
Alliance. However, Taliban and Hezb-e-Islami do not trust them. In the Parliament, the 
majority of the Meshrano Jirga and the Wolesi Jirga agree that reconciliation should take 
place and some tried to give some impetus to the process. Many different members of the 
parliament have genuine credibility with insurgent commanders. Some of the MPs have 
instituted programmes and movements at national and regional levels to contact and reconcile 
anti-governmental elements. 
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Meanwhile, Hezb-e-Islami claims to have split into two groups, one still linked to Gulbuddin 
Hekmatyar and currently active in the insurgency, and another which is part of the 
governmental system. Of 34 governors, as of spring 2009 more than one third belonged to or 
were politically affiliated with Hezb-e-Islami. Hekmatyar himself, according to Hezb-e-Islami 
sources, is willing to support reconciliation, but wants to see a timetable for the withdrawal of 
international military forces as a precondition to this process. A congress of Hezb-e-Islami, 
which took place in Kabul in July 2008, attended by government ministers linked to the party, 
showed that the split in this party between moderates and radicals is not substantial. Even 
among the ‘moderates’ support for Hekmatyar remains strong, despite the fact that he still 
figures on List 1267.13 It is believed that the two factions of Hezb-e-Islami would reunite if he 
is reconciled. Representatives of Hezb-e-Islami had meetings in different countries in Europe 
and also in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It would be a very positive step if the UN could meet at 
some point with representatives of Hezb-e-Islami and/or Gulbuddin Hekmatyar himself, 
despite his name being on List 1267. Many believe that Hekmatyar and some other Hezb-e-
Islami leaders are not any worse than some former jihadis who are already part of the 
government apparatus. Moreover, contradictions and divergences between Hezb-e-Islami and 
the Taliban should not be ignored. 
 
Most of the tribal leaders in unstable areas support anti-government elements, either directly 
or indirectly, due to their tribal links. Strong tribal leaders can still play an important role as 
they still believe in reconciliation as a concept. The majority of those who join the Taliban do 
so motivated by personal losses, mistreatment or the actions of international military forces; a 
minority also join for financial gain. The Taliban leaders are divided in regard to 
reconciliation. Mullah Omar is reportedly ready to start negotiations, however he is fearful of 
punishment by elements within the Pakistani  Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) and Al-
Qaeda. Very few radical Taliban leaders are very close to Al-Qaeda, and therefore there are 
few who do not support the idea of reconciliation. This stated, those who are willing to be 
reconciled are hesitant due in part to the pressure exerted on them by the more radical 
elements in the organisation, and also because they do not trust the PTS programme as run by 
Mojaddedi. They are sceptical that in the event of a reconciliation process they would receive 
protection from the Afghan government, coalition forces or from NATO. In general, Taliban 
leaders believe that the Organisation for Islamic Countries (OIC) and the UN have a role to 
play in the process of reconciliation. Already a number of high-level former Taliban have 
joined the system and held positions in government, for example: Munib, former Governor of 
Uruzgan, now member of Afghanistan/Pakistan Peace Jirga; Khial Mohammad Husseini, 
former Governor of Zabul, now Wolesi Jirga member; and Naim Kuchi, former high-ranking 
Taliban official, currently a Meshrano Jirga member. A few others, such as Mullah Zaeef, and 
Mullah Mutawakil, are in regular contact with President Karzai specifically on reconciliation 
issues.  
 
There are well-known Afghan and Pakistan Taliban Shuras, including: the Supreme 
Leadership Council (Quetta Shura), the Peshawar Shura, the N. Waziristan Shura and the S. 
Waziristan Shura. The latter two include Pakistan Taliban supporting the Afghan Taliban in 
Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Quetta Shura under the leadership of Mullah Omar reportedly 
has hardcore Taliban members who are very closely linked with Al Qaida. They are 
reportedly strongly against any reconciliation process. Most of the other members of the 
                                                 
13 In 1999, the UNSC passed Resolution 1267 establishing the 1267 Committee (also known as the ‘Al Qaida 
and Taliban Sanctions Committee’), tasked with monitoring the implementation of sanctions against the Taliban 
(from 1999) and Al Qaida (from 2000). The 1267 regime provided for the freezing of assets, a travel ban, and an 
arms embargo against those individuals and organisations included in the Consolidated List. 
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shura, who are willing to be reconciled and take part in this political process, are afraid to say 
this openly because of the presence of Al Qaida and some ISI elements. The same picture can 
be related to many of the Shura, including the Peshawar Shura. Nevertheless, some would like 
to start this process. This presents an opportunity at least to start some level of talks. Taliban 
who are now operating in Afghanistan are now being rotated every two to three months to 
new areas to prevent them from getting close to the people. This demonstrates the concern of 
the Taliban command that some are getting ready to talk and are setting up links and making 
contact with local officials. At the same time, the Taliban are receiving more and more 
recruits, mainly due to bad governance issues and air strikes, because there is no alternative 
way to express dissent (Interviews, Taliban representatives). 
 
The Positions of the Key International Actors toward Reconciliation. 
In the past and under the Bush administration, the US had no developed position regarding 
reconciliation. Under the Obama administration, the US has clearly enunciated a position 
stating a desire for reconciliation with moderate Taliban. The US had been walking a 
tightrope between an increasing awareness (especially within the State Department) of the 
role that reconciliation will play in stabilising Afghanistan, and the legal and congressional 
constraints that make supporting political outreach activities to armed groups very difficult. 
This is partly why the PTS programme, for which the US is the major donor, had 
concentrated on the lower level Taliban. The US is dissatisfied, however, with the progress 
made under Professor Mojaddedi’s leadership, and had previously sought to identify ways to 
reach a more substantial group of potential reconcilees.  
 
The US thought in terms of a two-track reconciliation process, with PTS focusing on low-
level insurgents and a new higher (but less visible or formal) track, run by the Presidential 
Office. In addition, they wanted, as did the UK, the president to appoint a reconciliation 
official, reporting directly to the president, who would serve as the government focal point or 
coordinator. This official would oversee both tracks, with oversight responsibility for PTS. 
The US wanted the commission under Professor Mojadeddi to be expanded in order to reflect 
the president’s board of tribal advisors. It would have preferred PTS to be better coordinated 
among all actors at the provincial level, including offices in a larger number of provinces. 
However, no clear action has since taken place. 
 
The UK has been very interested in the dimension of reconciliation that empowers alienated 
communities and local structures. The UK has been a key financial supporter of the PTS, but 
saw its value primarily as an information-gathering tool, rather than as a way to conduct 
political outreach. Like the US, they wanted to overhaul the PTS and President Karzai to 
appoint a reconciliation ‘tsar’. The UK wanted to see an advisory (not executive) commission 
supporting the reconciliation tsar, consisting of National Directorate of Security, National 
Security Council, International Directorate of Local Governance, Peace Strengthening 
Commission and other representatives, reflecting the ethnic and political diversity of 
Afghanistan. They also wanted to see a UN representative on this commission, in part to 
facilitate recommendations from the commission to the 1267 Committee. With regard to PTS, 
the UK was keen to see PTS offices in the provinces co-located with governor’s offices, who 
would have had the lead on reconciliation at the provincial level. The UK also wanted PTS to 
develop effective ‘back to work’ programmes, which might be easier for other donors to fund. 
Their current position is not certain now.  
 
In reconciliation efforts the British are generally not trusted by many in Afghanistan, as 
shown for example in the case of the reconciliation effort that took place in Musa Qala. This 
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initiative started in 2006, and was a very positive idea and the very first effort in 
reconciliation. It should be noted that it was not fully supported by the US government or the 
government of Afghanistan. Ex-Taliban commander Mullah Salam was convinced to join and 
appointed as district governor of Musa Qala. According to the agreement, he was supposed to 
be supported by British military forces. In reality, and according to him, he was neither given 
adequate support, nor the resources as promised by the British military and the government of 
Afghanistan. He became a target for the Taliban and on a number of occasions his family, 
who lived in a district close to Musa Qala, were attacked by the Taliban. He duly requested 
protection for his family from British military forces and the ANSF. Despite being promised 
this protection, it never materialised. Several of his close relatives, including his son, have 
been killed. As a tribal and religious leader, he is very frustrated and not sure about what to 
do. He stated that had he known in advance of all these failings, he would never have joined 
the side of the government. He stated that he was absolutely safe with the Taliban, and that 
now that he is not part of the Taliban he is a target. He also remains uncertain as to whether if 
he is part of the government apparatus or not (Interview, Mullah Salam). This has not helped 
the process of political settlement and shows that if not all parties are confident, or on board, 
good initiatives can fail and effective reconciliation be aborted. 
 
The European Union (EU) understands the crucial role of reconciliation in a peace process. 
Some European countries have significant ties with the Northern Alliance, which is not yet 
ready to fully support this process. It is also probably difficult for the EU to send messages in 
support of reconciliation to their capitals in Europe, due partly to domestic public opinion, fed 
by the media, which is strongly anti-Taliban and Hezb-e-Islami. Nonetheless, some European 
countries are keen supporters of reconciliation, as demonstrated by the funding they have 
given to the PTS programme. They believe that political outreach to counter alienation among 
Pashtun communities is the key to lasting stability in the South. Moreover, an increasing 
number of EU countries are becoming interested in a political process. The perception is that 
they are waiting only for a clear statement and policy from the Obama administration in the 
US, and for the US to take the lead. 
 
Russia, despite having been against reconciliation in recent years with those whom they 
perceive to be terrorists (due to negative experiences with extremist ‘Wahabi’ elements in 
Russia), is currently open to discussions about possible options for a political process. Russia 
is against Hezb-e-Islami, possibly because of the perception that Hezb-e-Islami was the most 
stubborn jihadi group in fighting against the Soviets and their client regime in Afghanistan in 
the 1980s. The Taliban are also considered to be a terrorist group, and Russia believes they 
should not be recognised as a political group or a force, failing however to differentiate 
between moderate and hardcore Taliban. This point of view will hopefully change. Russia has 
also stated that they would not object to reconciliation with those anti-government elements 
who are ready to stop fighting and to support the Afghan constitution. 
 
Regional actors who are neighbours of Afghanistan are in general supportive of the political 
process. Turkmenistan previously had friendly relations with the Taliban regime, based upon 
their official policy of positive neutrality. They are supportive of the political process and 
understand that this conflict cannot be solved by military means only. Turkmen government 
officials have stated that they are ready to support this political process by all means. 
 
Uzbekistan, one of the largest Central Asian states, believes that the Karzai government in 
Afghanistan is very weak and is unable to control the situation in the country. They 
understand, however, that a political process is both important and necessary. Therefore they 
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have proposed their own solution for the Afghan conflict, which centres on the reactivation of 
6+2 (the six neighbouring countries of Afghanistan plus the US and Russia), as 6+3 (6+2 with 
the addition of one more actor, which would be NATO). Most of the representatives of the 
international community believe that Afghanistan should be part of these talks as the Karzai 
government is generally recognised as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. Uzbekistan 
hold the differing view that the presence of Afghanistan as part of 6+3 is irrelevant as the 
government of Afghanistan is unsustainable. 
 
Tajikistan has close historical, cultural and traditional links with the country. As is 
understood, Tajiks compose the second largest group in Afghanistan and speak the same 
language. During the Taliban period, the Tajiks largely supported the Northern Alliance. 
Tajikistan’s view is that they are ready support the reconciliation process under Karzai’s 
government and have offered to share about their experiences of reconciliation in the wake of 
the civil war in Tajikistan. 
 
China, which is also one of the bordering countries with Afghanistan, is positive towards a 
political settlement of the conflict. However, Chinas is currently focused mainly on trade and 
economic matters. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) member states are now 
paying serious attention to the conflict in Afghanistan. Russia’s attempt to establish security 
belts capable of preventing drugs and terrorism coming from Afghanistan is the main issue 
now being considered by the SCO (Matveeva and Giustozzi 2008). 
 
Iran is regarded as the principal external supporter of the Northern Alliance and is unlikely to 
support the Taliban strategically. Iran has never enjoyed good relations with the Taliban 
regime, but it mostly had good relations with another component of the opposition, Hezb-e-
Islami. At this stage Iran is likely to act opportunistically against perceived enemies, 
including the US, with its involvement in Afghanistan, and in particular if the US is perceived 
by Iran to be seeking to establish a strategic presence in the country, beyond stabilising it. 
According to Taliban and local Afghan sources along the border with Iran, Taliban 
messengers were sent several times to Iran to meet with radical Iranian elements and discuss 
the issue of support to anti-government elements. Reportedly, certain radical elements in Iran 
have been providing such elements with limited support including medicines, light arms, 
logistics, as well as training on the Iranian side of the border for some groups operating in 
western Afghanistan. When international actors try to bring this matter up, officials in Tehran 
deny this and President Karzai supports the Iranian position in this regard. Iran supports 
reconciliation with Hezb-e-Islami elements; however, officially Tehran does not support 
reconciliation with the Taliban as a political group.  
 
Pakistan has been a long-term advocate of reconciliation. The Taliban were the only regime in 
the history of Afghanistan to have had very close relations with the Pakistani government, and 
especially with elements of the ISI and the Pakistan army. Certain elements within the ISI and 
the army have traditionally been very close to hardcore Taliban elements. Prime Minister Asif 
Gilani belongs to the Pakistan Peoples’ Party, now in a coalition government with Awami 
National Party (ANP), which continues to advocate reconciliation and negotiations. 
Meanwhile, Afrasiab Khattaq, ANP party leader in the North-West Frontier Province, 
suggested inviting all Taliban, including Baitullah Massoud, to sit down to discuss 
reconciliation. President Zardari has established a good rapport with President Karzai. The 
Peace Jirga initiative was supported by Pakistan and Afghanistan to bring together influential 
leaders from both sides of the border to discuss options for a peaceful solution. The first 
Peace Jirga took place in August 2007 in Kabul, and the second in 2008 in Islamabad. This 
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initiative, and military operations in parts of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) 
have convinced Kabul that Pakistan’s open approach to Taliban presence on its territory may 
now be at an end. However the resolution by the Pakistani parliament, calling for Pakistan to 
halt military operations and to re-initiate negotiations across the board, demonstrates that the 
constituency for a forward approach to counter-insurgency remains limited.  
 
According to Taliban sources, apart from military operations in Bajaur and Swat, elements 
within the Pakistan army have been quite consistent in supporting Taliban groups operating in 
Afghanistan. Recruitment, training and logistics bases in FATA, Baluchistan and elsewhere 
for the Taliban are still intact. Pakistani security forces have concentrated on attacking and 
eliminating mainly those groups and persons who represent a threat to their domestic security. 
Whilst the ISI has developed a substantial counter-terrorism capability, eliminating and 
arresting hundreds of Al Qaida operatives, there is a strong perception among Afghans on 
both sides of the border that elements within ISI and Pakistan still continue to support 
Taliban, the Haqqani network and Hezb-e-Islami armed groups. They have established 
enduring truces with those oriented towards jihad in Afghanistan and punished those who are 
willing to reconcile without Pakistani involvement. In a conversation with a reconciled former 
Taliban official, the following example came up. Mullah Muhibullah, former governor of 
Jawzjan province during the Taliban regime and a man who spent several years in the 
Guantanamo facility, upon release spent one-and-a half years in Kandahar. As a result of 
mistreatment by international military forces and ANSF towards him and his family − 
including house searches, disrespect towards his family members and suspicion regarding his 
former links with Taliban elements − he was forced to relocate to Quetta in Pakistan. 
Subsequent to this he rejoined the Taliban in Quetta and was appointed by the Taliban to be 
the focal point for operations planning in the south of Afghanistan. Once, when he spoke with 
local Taliban commanders in the south of Afghanistan he told commanders not to attack 
Afghans during operations, and to attack only international military forces, because he 
regarded Afghans, in whatever capacity, as being brothers. When this request of Mullah 
Muhibullah was passed to certain elements in the ISI, and when he returned to Pakistan, after 
being in Afghanistan on operations, he was arrested. From this example it could be inferred 
that certain elements in ISI still support those hardcore elements in the Taliban and punish 
those who show an interest in reconciliation without their permission. This is confirmed by 
other Taliban sources also (Interviews, reconciled Taliban officials). 
 
It also needs to be understood that Pakistan is concerned, for its own security, not to have a 
government in Afghanistan that is close to India. Pakistan suspects Indian NGOs and private 
companies, which are present along the Afghan-Pakistan border on the Afghanistan side, of 
being engaged not only in contracted work, but also in clandestine activities. Pakistan also 
claims, understandably, that the family of the leader of the armed opposition in Balochistan, 
Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, who was killed in Pakistan by the army, has taken refuge in Kabul. 
This should also be taken into account when trying to understand Pakistan’s position. 
 
Despite India’s support of the Northern Alliance during the Taliban period, which clearly 
illustrates its anti-Taliban position during that time, the current Indian position is to support 
reconciliation with those who are not on the consolidated List 1267 and who support the 
current Afghan constitution. This is very similar to the position of Russia towards 
reconciliation. The Taliban do not trust India, since India is well known to be a past supporter 
of the Northern Alliance. 
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Saudi Arabia has always relied heavily on Pakistan in shaping its policy towards Afghanistan. 
During the jihad of the 1980s, Saudi funds and expertise were channelled to the mujahidin 
almost exclusively through the ISI. During the Taliban regime, Saudi Arabia was one of only 
three states (with Pakistan and the UAE) to establish diplomatic relations with the Taliban 
government of Mullah Omar. Since 2001, Saudi Arabia has been cautious in its relations with 
Afghanistan as a result of the strong perceived influence of Shia Iran, post-Soviet Russia and 
India as well as of the Northern Alliance, which formed the largest party to the Bonn 
Agreement. From the beginning, President Karzai has sought to improve relations with Saudi 
Arabia, but has not yet met with any significant results. In 2007, Saudi Arabia began to adjust 
its orientation once the Taliban began to threaten the internal security of Pakistan. It is also 
notable that Saudi Arabia paid greater respect to President Karzai during his last visit and 
Saudi Arabia made an unprecedented pledge at the Paris Conference in 2008. The Saudi royal 
family remains deeply ambiguous in their posture towards Afghanistan today. The Taliban are 
still held in high regard and are regarded as legitimate successors to the mujahidin of the 
1980s: their Deobandi views are closer to those of Saudi Arabia's Wahabis. This is 
particularly in relation to the more conventional Sufi-influenced approach to Islam 
historically prevalent in Afghanistan. 
 
Saudi Arabia remains suspicious of Iranian influence and intentions in Afghanistan. However, 
with the international community increasingly focused on bringing stability and development 
to Afghanistan and the insurgency fuelling deep hostility towards Pakistan within 
Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia has been under steadily growing pressure to expand its relations 
with Kabul, rather than implicitly supporting Pakistan’s agenda there. Saudi Arabia, like 
Pakistan, favours reconciliation, but unlike Pakistan has fewer national interests at stake in the 
success of such an initiative. According to Taliban sources, the Saudis have close relations 
with them. The Taliban trust them more than other countries and therefore would prefer to 
have the Saudis as one of the parties involved, if reconciliation talks were to commence. 
Saudi Arabia is not willing to be perceived as being supportive of the Taliban, however in 
reality they can influence the Taliban when necessary. In 2007, Riyadh signalled it was 
prepared to reinforce its direct relations with Kabul and stop the ‘out-sourcing’ of relations to 
Islamabad. This began a series of visits by emissaries of President Karzai on the one hand and 
King Abdullah’s envoys on the other. These contacts culminated in an Iftar14 given by King 
Abdullah for several senior Afghan government representatives and reconciled Taliban in 
Riyadh in late-September 2008. This was a clear signal that Saudi King Abdullah was 
prepared to play a greater role in an Afghan peace process and this process is still alive. There 
are different initiatives organised by Hezb-e-Islami and the international community, which 
are on-going, but there is no clear message as yet. 
 
What has been done 
With regard to reconciliation, the PTS has made some progress. However it has not reached 
far enough, and the lack of a coordinated support from the international community, ISAF 
and coalition forces has been a problem. List 1267 − expanded after September 11, 2001 and 
last updated on October 10, 2008 − now features 142 individuals associated with the Taliban, 
and 243 individuals and 113 entities or other groups and undertakings associated with Al 
Qaida. Despite reconciliation with the Karzai government by senior listed Taliban such as 
Mullah Mutawakil, Mullah Zaeef, Mullah Salaam Rocketi, Mullah Khaksar and others, none 
has been de-listed, largely as a result of differences among permanent UNSC members. Up to 
one third of those Taliban now on the Consolidated List also feature on ISAF and OEF target 
                                                 
14 During Ramadan, the meal that follows the end of fasting at dusk. 
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lists. Several have been killed in combat. Under heavy pressure from the US and the UK, 
Pakistan has placed a small number of anti-government elements under house arrest in Quetta 
and elsewhere. This has not prevented them from continuing to exercise authority in their 
respective organisations. The vast majority of insurgent commanders now operating in 
Afghanistan are not listed: they are too young to have participated in the Taliban regime. 
Apart from Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Jalaluddin Haqqani themselves, almost no Hezb-i-
Islami Gulbuddin or Haqqani network commanders feature on the Consolidated List. 
 
In response to directions in UNAMA’s March 2007 mandate renewal, and the growing body 
of opinion in favour of the need for a political solution, UNAMA has expanded its dialogue 
and political outreach in support of the ongoing Afghan government reconciliation program 
(PTS). It has become clear that, while there is a growing consensus both within the Afghan 
government and international community in favour of promoting reconciliation, all actors 
recognise that the PTS programme is unable to reach the breadth of anti-government elements 
wishing to reconcile. UNAMA mandates from 2007 through to 2009 (UNSC 2007, 2008, 
2009) have all included the role and attempt to further the reconciliation process by: 
 
1. Supporting the Afghan government, and assisting the National Security Council’s 
office in order to produce key principles for an overall strategy toward reconciliation; 
2. Holding meetings with anti-government elements or their representatives when they 
have made contact with UNAMA, then passing information on to government bodies. 
UNAMA first met Taliban representatives in 2003, and held several meetings with low-level 
Taliban commanders. Reports of these meetings were passed to the SRSG’s Office. In 2004-
5, UNAMA did not have any meetings with anti-government elements. In 2006, meetings 
started again with representatives of anti-government elements, upon their request, including 
the Taliban. UNAMA political affairs officers held these meetings with the view to 
understanding the position of these groups and representatives, and informed the Afghan 
government. According to anti-government elements and their representatives, these meetings 
with UNAMA were called and held because they are, in their view, unable to speak directly 
with the Afghan government because it is too weak. They also do not trust the international 
military forces, as they are targeting them. This is why UNAMA is the only relatively 
credible organisation that can be approached by them in Afghanistan. Recent attempts by the 
Afghan government, started in 2008, to talk directly to the Taliban through Qauym Karzai, 
President Karzai’s elder brother, created the misperception among Afghans that this was not a 
transparent government programme towards reconciliation, but rather a process driven by 
family interests. Although Qayum Karzai certainly had good intentions to help to bring about 
peace, it would perhaps have been more useful if the Afghan government had officially 
selected someone to lead this initiative. 
 
Conclusion 
President Karzai and the broader government have expressed to the head of UNAMA their 
support for UNAMA’s role in assisting reconciliation activities. However, the government’s 
ire with British efforts undertaken in Helmand in December 2007 − of which the president felt 
he had insufficient knowledge, and in which a UNAMA staff member was accidentally 
caught up − has increased the government’s desire for greater control over the process. 
Additionally, in cases when UNAMA has made significant progress in facilitating a 
rapprochement between anti-government activists and the government, on several occasions 
funds given to support their rehabilitation have not been made available, suggesting that the 
government is not quite as ready for reconciliation as the rhetoric sometimes suggests. After 
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the re-election of President Karzai in 2009, statements coming from the capitals of the 
western world have shown a growing determination to pursue the path of negotiations with 
the Taliban. There is still ambiguity with regard to who should be involved in negotiations but 
it seems increasingly implicit that the leadership might be included too. 
 
The language on reconciliation in recent mandate renewal, as in UNSC Resolution 1868 
(2009), shows international support for UNAMA’s role as a primary facilitator and leading 
coordinator of the international civilian effort in Afghanistan. Expectations of UNAMA 
providing leadership on this issue are therefore high and need to be managed. UNAMA, as 
empowered both by the recent mandate renewal (UNSCR 2009) and the support of the 
Afghan government and the international community, is in principle well placed to lead the 
international civilian community effort in support of the Afghan government’s efforts in 
reconciliation. The evidence of dozens of anti-government elements coming to meet with 
UNAMA in an attempt to seek an alternative to fighting, suggests that the Taliban and fellow 
anti-government elements also see a place for UNAMA as a bridge in this process. 
 
UNAMA’s role should be that of a primary facilitator, in keeping with its mandate and the 
UN’s trusted historical role and additional expertise. As such, UNAMA should seek to take 
advantage of the reservoir of good will it has accumulated during the course of its existence, 
and under the mandate of good offices stated in UNSC Resolution 1868 (2009). This was 
stated initially in UNSC Resolution 1746 (2007), sharpened in UNSC Resolution 1806 (2008) 
and further developed in UNSC Resolution 1868 (2009). In its role of good offices, relevant 
parties of UNAMA should have contact with anti-government groups willing to discuss peace 
and reconciliation so as to conduct themselves in accordance with the Afghan constitution. 
Individuals contacted by UNAMA in this context should initially exclude those persons 
whose names appear in lists connected with UNSC Resolution 1267. The UN and possibly the 
OIC will act as facilitators to engage in the reconciliation process/dialogue, involving key 
countries such as the US, UK, EU countries, Russia, China, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, India, 
Iran and others. 
 
With the advice and encouragement of key international community stakeholders and the 
UNSC, the Afghan government should create a commission, broader than the current PTS 
commission, that consists of representatives of the key governmental institutions and 
community leaders from active conflict zones where anti-government elements are known to 
be broadly supported (i.e. community leaders who are not insurgents themselves but who are 
known to have contacts and a certain degree of sympathy for the insurgency). Anti-
government elements seeking reconciliation, either with or without UNAMA encouragement, 
would approach this group, which would interview individuals and issue documents to those 
approved for reconciliation. Such documents would be designed to guarantee non-harassment 
by international or Afghan government forces. 
 
In order to build upon and to develop the positive achievements already made, the Afghan 
government should also come up with an official proposal regarding the delisting of only 
Afghan nationals from the consolidated List 1267. The Afghan parliament (both houses) has 
already expressed the opinion that only Afghans can decide who is a criminal and who should 
be forgiven. The delisting of Afghan nationals from List 1267 will show the readiness of the 
Afghan government to begin reconciliation and build trust among anti-government elements. 
Only by speaking with important Taliban and Hezb-e-Islami leaders can meaningful and 
important results be achieved. Moreover, this would help to balance the inadequacies and 
injustices in the inclusion of significant political players in the Bonn process: a matter which 
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poses very real challenges in relation to current legitimacy in the eyes of the Pashtun majority 
in particular. Once opposition groups (Taliban and Hezb-e-Islami) agree upon conditions of 
reconciliation, they should be given the opportunity to take part in the elections. Elections 
should ideally be postponed, unless a proper reconciliation process begins.  Furthermore, it 
could be very dangerous to wait for the conflict to be exhausted before, or indeed prior to, 
starting negotiations.  
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